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THE PARENTAL TORT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE: IS IT A
DEFENSIBLE DEFENSE?*
I. INTRODUCTION
If the overriding purpose of tort law is to compensate those
injured by the wrongdoing of another, then intrafamily tort
immunities have historically defeated that purpose. Their effect
is to leave an uncompensated injured party with no remedy
simply by virtue of the tortfeasor's familial relationship to the
injured person.
This survey focuses on the doctrine of parental tort immunity
and concludes that, although numerous exceptions exist, the
rationales advanced for the doctrine's continued existence are of
questionable relevance today.
II. HISTORY OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY
A. Early Common Law
At common law, a child, emancipated or not, could sue a
parent for breach of contract and for property-related torts.'
* This paper was the winner of the 1995 McNeill Writing Competition.
1. See, e.g., Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw.
1969); Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (N.C. 1923) (permitting children to sue
parents for trespass to or misappropriation of child's property because child is regard-
ed as separate entity in such cases); State v. Bell, 115 S.E. 190 (N.C. 1922) (support);
Dunn v. Beaman, 36 S.E. 172 (N.C. 1900) (conversion); Kimbrough v. Davis, 16 N.C.
51 (1 Dev. Eq.) (1827) (breach of contract); Lamb v. Lamb, 41 N.E. 26 (N.Y. 1895);
Gully v. Gully, 231 S.W. 97 (Tex. 1921) (support); See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. b (1977); JOHN DE WrI GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTAND-
ING FAMILY LAW § 6.02 (1993); PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW § 8.01 (1990).
For analysis of and commentary on parental immunity generally, see WALTER
WADLINGTON ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 10-23 (1983); Frederick B.
Barder & John D. Ingram, The Decline of the Doctrine of Parent-Child Tort Immunity,
68 ILL. Bus. J. 596 (1980); Kathryn Calibey, Connecticut's Parent-Child Immunity
Doctrine, 65 CONN. BUS. J. June 6, 1991, at 210; Harlin Ray Dean, Jr., It's Time to
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Furthermore, adult and emancipated children could sue a par-
Abolish North Carolina's Parent-Child Immunity, But Who's Going to Do It?, Coffey v.
Coffey and North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-539.21, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1317
(1990); Beth Ann Falk, Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.: North Carolina Retains Its Partial
Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1457 (1987); David L. Grobart,
Parent-Child Tort Immunity in Illinois, 17 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 303 (1986); Randall K.
Hanson, Parental Liability, 62 WIS. LAw., (Sept. 1989 at 24.); Gail G. Hollister, Par-
ent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of a Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489
(1982); William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521
(1960); Thomas A. Montminy, Torts, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1153 (1986); Martin J.
Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the
Parent, 25 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1161 (1991); Val Sanford, Personal Torts Within the
Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956); Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of
Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543 (1992); Isabel Wingerter, Parent-Child Tort Im-
munity, 50 LA. L. REV. 1131 (1990); Edwin D. Akers & William H. Drummond, Com-
ment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family, 26 MO. L. REV. 152 (1961);
Cynthia J. Atchison, Note, Ard v. Ard: Limiting the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine,
44 U. PITT. L. REV. 977 (1983); Connie K. Beck et al., Comment, The Rights of Chil-
dren: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 669 (1978); Susan G. Chopin, Note, Par-
ent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule in Need of Change, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191 (1972);
Rhonda Ilene Framm, Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: Time for Maryland to
Abrogate an Anachronism, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 435 (1982); Kevin Fularczyk, Note,
Parent-Child Immunity After Carey v. Meijer, Inc., 35 WAYNE L. REV. 153 (1988);
Frederick W. Grimm, Recent Development, Merrick v. Sutterlin, 56 WAsH. L. REV.
319 (1981); Eric T. Lanham, Comment, Suing Parents in Tort for Child Abuse: A New
Role for the Court Appointed Guardian ad Litem?, 61 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 101
(1992); Mark Lanni, Casenote, Children May Recover from Parents in Personal Injury
Actions, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 737 (1986); Kathryn Webb Lovill, Note, Frye v. Frye:
Maryland Sacrifices the Child for the Sake of the Family, 46 MD. L. REV. 194 (1986);
Carla Maria Marcolin, Comment, Rousey v. Rousey: The District of Columbia Joins
the National Trend Towards Abolition of Parental Immunity, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 767
(1988); Timothy I. McArdle, Casenote, Stallman v. Youngquist- Parent-Child Tort
Immunity: Will Illinois Ever Give this Doctrine the Examination and Analysis it De-
serves?, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 807 (1986); Chanse McLeod, Note, Jilani v. Jilani:
The Erosion of The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine in Texas, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 717
(1991); Samuel Mark Pipino, Comment, In Whose Best Interest? Exploring the Contin-
uing Viability of the Parental Immunity Doctrine, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1111 (1992); Ed-
ward J. Pulaski, Jr., Comment, Parent-Child Immunity: The Case for Abolition, 6 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 286 (1969); Mebane M. Rash, Note, The North Carolina Supreme
Court Engages in Stealthy Judicial Legislation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1227 (1993); Kirk A.
Schmidtman, Note, The Demise of the Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 12 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 605 (1976); Cynthia Ann Tolch, Note, Will Junior's First Words Be "I'll See You
In Court!"?, 58 Mo. L. REV. 251 (1993); Martha Vardiman, Casenote, Ohio Abolishes
Intrafamilial Tort Immunity: Shearer v. Shearer, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 305 (1986); Note,
Tort Liability Within the Family-A Suggested Approach, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 610
(1956); Ramnaldo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemanci-
pated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence-Modern Cases, 6 A-L.R.4th 1066, 1078
n.49 (1981) (collected cases on parental immunity); Albin E. Korpch, Liability of Par-
ent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence, Annotation, 41
A.L.R.3d 904, 927-40 (1972); W.E. Shipiley, Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Right
of Action Between Husband and Wife or Parent and Child, 96 A.L.R.2d 973 (1964)
(conflict of laws regarding actions between spouses and parent and child).
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ent for all torts, whether personal, property-related, or contract-
based.2 Thus, until 1891, a vacuum existed in American law
regarding personal tort causes of action by an unemancipated
minor against his or her parent.3
B. First Pronouncement of Parental Immunity & Its
Consequences
The first parental immunity rule came from the Supreme
Court of Mississippi in Hewlette v. George.4 The plaintiff in
Hewlette was the minor daughter of the defendant; she was
married but separated from her husband.5 The daughter sued
her mother for false imprisonment, alleging that she was
wrongfully committed to an insane asylum.6 Without citing any
2. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 63 A.2d 586 (Conn. 1948); Reese v. Reese, 236
S.E.2d 20 (Ga. App. 1977); Carricato v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964);
Waltzinger v. Birsner, 128 A.2d 617 (Md. 1957) (holding that parents are not pro-
tected by immunity from suits by emancipated children); Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman,
403 A.2d 379 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (abrogating immunity for suits by emancipat-
ed children and for suits involving cruel, inhuman or willful misconduct, but preserv-
ing immunity for parental negligence in business context); Weyen v. Weyen, 139 So.
608 (Miss. 1932) (holding that emancipated children can sue parent for all torts);
Gillikin v. Burbage, 139 S.E.2d 753 (N.C. 1965) (describing what constitutes eman-
cipation); Weinberg v. Underwood, 244 A.2d 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968);
Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 427 P.2d 655 (N.M. 1967); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla.
1964); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 57 A.2d 426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948); Parker v. Parker, 94
S.E.2d 12 (S.C. 1956); Logan v. Reaves, 354 S.W.2d 789 (Tenn. 1962); Glover v.
Glover, 319 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 74 S.E.2d 170
(Va. 1953); Groh v. W.O. Krahn, Inc., 271 N.W. 374 (Wis. 1937).
3. See, e.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951) ("[Tlhere is nothing in
the English decisions to suggest that at common law a child could not sue a parent
for a personal tort."); Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923) (Clark, C.J., dis-
senting) (urging that basic laws of insurance and indemnity apply and pointing out
both the conspicuous absence of any case law, English or American, supporting the
majority's position that minors cannot sue parents in tort, and noting that children
have brought cases against parents for partition of real estate, conversion, embezzle-
ment, libel and slander); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. b
(1977).
4. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). Mississippi reiterated its support of the Hewlette rule
in 1971. See McNeal v. Estate of McNeal, 254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971).
5. Hewlette, 9 So. at 887.
6. Id. at 885. Additional facts are sparse in the decision, but in his book Profes-
sor Epstein explains that the plaintiff was a prostitute in Chicago and her mother
managed to talk her into coming home to Mississippi with the intent of reforming
her wayward daughter. However, the plaintiff never changed her ways, so her mother
committed her to an insane asylum, where she stayed for 10 days. At trial, the jury
awarded plaintiff $5000, but the trial judge set aside that award, entering judgment
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authority and basing its decision entirely on policy grounds, the
court held that so long as the parent and child are obligated by
their reciprocal family duties to one another, a child cannot
seek civil redress for personal injuries resulting from a parent's
wrongdoing.7 No distinction was made between actions for neg-
ligent, reckless, or intentional torts. The court concluded that
such causes of action would undermine the "peace of society,
and of the families composing society, and a sound public poli-
cy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best
interests of society .... 8 The court felt that the state's crimi-
nal laws offered sufficient protection for children.9
Following Hewlette, there was widespread adoption of paren-
tal immunity. Some states barred only negligence claims by an
unemancipated child," while others prohibited even intentional
tort claims." As might have been anticipated, the doctrine re-
sulted in some outrageous and unjust decisions. Unemancipated
children were prohibited from recovering from their parent for
injuries resulting from rape," brutal beatings," car acci-
for $200. The Supreme Court of Mississippi refused to reinstate the jury verdict.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS at 842 (5th ed. 1990).
7. Hewlette, 9 So. at 887.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (applying Mary-
land law); Schneider v. Schneider, 152 A. 498 (Md. 1930) (barring parent's suit
against child for auto negligence); Lund v. Olson, 237 N.W. 188 (Minn. 1931) (adopt-
ing traditional immunity); Hastings v. Hastings, 163 A.2d 147 (N.J. 1961); Nahas v.
Noble, 420 P.2d 127 (N.M. 1966); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 162 N.E. 551 (N.Y. 1928);
Chaffin v. Chaffin, 397 P.2d 771 (Or. 1964); Castellucci v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467
(R.I. 1963); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 250 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. 1952); Norfolk Southern
R.R. v. Gretakis, 174 S.E. 841 (Va. 1934) (holding that an emancipated child can sue
a parent for all torts and an unemancipated child can sue a parent if there is a
master-servant relationship between them and can sue the parent's master for inju-
ries resulting from servant-parent's negligence); Stevens v. Murphy, 421 P.2d 668
(Wash. 1966); DeLay v. DeLay, 337 P.2d 1057 (Wash. 1959).
11. See, e.g., Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895); Smith v. Smith, 142 N.E.
128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1924) (regarding suit commenced after child reached majority for
assault which occured during child's minority); Miller v. Pelzer, 199 N.W. 97 (Minn.
1924) (regarding deceit); Cook v. Cook, 124 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939)
(concerning a brutal beating); Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923); McKelvey
v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903) (discussing a brutal beating by father and
stepmother); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905) (regarding a father convicted of
raping daughter who served time in penitentiary, as protected from suit by daughter
because of immunity).
12. See Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
13. See Cook v. Cook, 124 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939); McKelvey v.
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dents14 and other situations.15 Some courts barred claims
even though the parent-child relationship had been terminated
by death before suit was filed. 6
The reasons offered most frequently in support of parental
immunity include the preservation of family harmony and tran-
quility, and a tenuous analogy to interspousal immunity,
whereby a child was often prohibited from bringing an action
which a spouse would be permitted to bring. 8 Once liability
insurance became widespread, some courts gave an additional
reason for maintaining parental immunity: preventing collusion
between parent and child to defraud insurance companies. 9
Needless to say, the flimsy rationales for the doctrine and the
unjust results of its application led to gradual erosion of the
rule in those states which had adopted it.
McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
14. See Sanford v. Sanford, 290 A.2d 812 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (barring by
immunity, a child's auto negligence claim against father); Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E.
12 (N.C. 1923); Levesque v. Levesque, 106 A.2d 563 (N.H. 1954); Matarese v.
Matarese, 131 A. 198 (R.I. 1925) (providing an immunity bar to auto negligence
claims against a parent).
15. See Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983) (adopting parental au-
thority and discretion area of immunity and barring suit for negligent supervision
where child was injured by father's grain auger); Taubert v. Taubert, 114 N.W. 763
(Minn. 1908) (barring child's suit against mother for negligence in employment con-
text even though mother/owner had liability insurance); Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E.2d
223 (Va. 1972) (barring a young child from bringing suit when she was injured by
falling against metal awnings with jagged edges stored in her father's yard).
16. See Shaker v. Shaker, 29 A.2d 765 (Conn. 1942); Harralson v. Thomas, 269
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954); Damiano v. Damiano, 143 A. 3 (N.J. 1928) (holding that
where both the parent and the child are dead, and since the child had no right of
action at common law because of immunity, the child has no right of action under
the Death Act for wrongful death); Lasecki v. Kabara, 294 N.W. 33 (Wis. 1940).
17. E.g., Luster v. Luster, 13 N.E.2d 438 (Mass. 1938), overruled by Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Downs v. Poulin, 216 A.2d 29 (Me. 1966),
overruled by Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979).
18. E.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 114 S.W.2d 468 (Ark. 1938); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 145
A. 753 (Conn. 1929); Redding v. Redding, 70 S.E.2d 676 (N.C. 1952); Barranco v.
Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1985); Wick v. Wick, 212 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1927).
19. Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D.D.C. 1968) (purportedly adopting
parental immunity but creating exceptions for willful and wanton conduct, negligence
in employment context and death ending the parent-child relationship. But presence
of insurance actually supported the need for immunity because of the heightened
danger of fraud and collusion); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980)
(Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
III. CHIPPING AWAY AT THE DOCTRINE: EXCEPTIONS EMERGE
A. Early Challenges
Parental immunity for negligence was first successfully abol-
ished in its entirety in Goller v. White,2" except when the tort
involved "an exercise of parental authority ... [or] ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, cloth-
ing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care."2
Minnesota later adopted from Goller the same two instances
where immunity would still apply even after abrogating general
parental immunity by inserting the word "reasonable" before
the phrase "parental authority."
The first effective challenge to absolute immunity which
carved out an exception to the rule rather than completely
abrogating it, occurred in Dunlap v. Dunlap.' In Dunlap, the
plaintiff, who worked for his father (the defendant) and was
paid the same as his father's other employees, was injured on
the job. The court held that a parent could not claim immunity
when the parent had intentionally relinquished parental control
and when the child was that parent's servant.' The court not-
ed that the defendant had employer's liability insurance, where-
by he had voluntarily made arrangements to pass on his own
liability to the insurance company.25
20. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
21. Id. at 198. The plaintiff in Goller did state a cause of action against the
defendant. Id.
22. Silesky v. Kelman, 161 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 1968), overruled by Anderson v.
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
23. 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930) (offering a good discussion of the rights of minors at
common law to sue for personal injuries).
24. Id. at 912-13.
25. Id. See also William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
43 HARv. L. REV. 1030 (1930) (published days before the Dunlap opinion was issued
and supporting its rationale).
580 [Vol. 30:575
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B. Tort Theories Excepted from the Doctrine
1. Auto & Common Carrier Accident Personal Injuries
Perhaps the most common exception to the doctrine prohibits
the immunity defense for automobile accident negligence
claims.26 In abolishing immunity for auto negligence, some
courts held that the operation of an automobile does not involve
the exercise of parental authority or discretion, such that auto
accident claims would not interfere with the relationship that
immunity was designed to protect." In some jurisdictions, the
auto accident exception is the only recognized exception to pa-
rental immunity.
28
26. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572c (Supp. 1986) (abrogating auto negligence
immunity); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (legislative abrogation of
immunity for auto negligence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976), over-
ruled Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980) (abrogation of parental immunity
only for auto negligence claims violates equal protection); Ooms v. Ooms, 316 A.2d
783 (Conn. 1972) (applying parental immunity in other cases even though immunity
had been abrogated by statute for auto negligence claims); Williams v. Williams, 369
A.2d 669 (Del. 1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982) (waiving parental im-
munity for auto negligence but only to the extent of the parent's liability insurance);
Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Mll. 1993) (holding parental immunity inapplicable to
auto negligence claims but retaining it for parental discipline, supervision and care);
Deshotel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 243 So. 2d 259 (La. 1971) (allowing direct action
against insurer); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Black v.
Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979); Ledwell v. Berry, 249 S.E.2d 862 (N.C. Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 254 S.E.2d 35 (N.C. 1979); Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H.
1966) (creating auto negligence exception to immunity); Guterman v. Guterman, 328
A.2d 233 (N.J. 1974); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984) (creating auto
negligence exception to immunity); Silva v. Silva, 446 A-2d 1013 (R.I. 1982); Smith v.
Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Worrell v. Worrell, 4 S.E.2d 343 (Va. 1939)
(abrogation of immunity for common carrier negligence); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 610
P.2d 891 (Wash. 1980) (abrogating immunity for auto negligence and future deter-
mination of immunity in other contexts based on case-by-case analysis); Lee v. Comer,
224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976) (abolishing immunity for auto negligence); Dellapenta v.
Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992) (abolishing immunity for auto negligence);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dep't, 672 P.2d 810 (Wyo. 1983) (effectively abro-
gating immunity as to auto negligence by holding household exclusion clauses inval-
id); cf. Coffey v. Coffey, 381 S.E.2d 467 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (barring parent's suit
against child after majority for auto injuries during child's minority).
27. See Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066; Black, 409 A-2d 634; Unah, 676 P.2d 1366; Smith,
183 S.E.2d 190; Merrick, 610 P.2d 891; Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (operation of car is
not a parental function).
28. See Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 342 S.E.2d 882 (N.C. 1986) (statutory abolition
of immunity in auto accident cases prevents further abrogation by the courts);
Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util., 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986) (exceptions to
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On the other hand, some states prohibit parental liability
even for auto accidents.29 The Maryland Supreme Court had
concerns that abrogating immunity for auto accidents might
interfere with both parental authority and the state's compulso-
ry insurance scheme."
In Levesque v. Levesque,31  the New Hampshire Supreme
Court retreated from its decision in Dunlap by prohibiting a
minor child from suing his parent for auto accident injuries,
holding that "the existence of liability insurance [does not]
create a right of action where none would otherwise exist." 2
The widespread abrogation of parental immunity as to motor
vehicle negligence created a backlash by insurance companies,
which began inserting "household exclusion" clauses in policies
excluding coverage for family members living in the insured's
household. 3 Some courts have held such exclusion clauses in-
valid,34 while others have upheld the clauses as valid limita-
tions of liability.
35
immunity are limited to auto negligence and willful misconduct torts).
29. See Coleman v. Coleman, 278 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (barring child
from suing noncustodial parent for auto negligence); Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md.
1986) (holding that the traditional basis for immunity, i.e. preserving family tranquil-
ity, is still valid today. The court refuses to abrogate it even for auto negligence
claims because that is within the purview of the legislature, which had created a
mandatory auto liability insurance scheme); Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221
(Tenn. 1985).
30. Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986).
31. 106 A.2d 563 (N.H. 1954), overruled by Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H.
1966).
32. Levesque, 106 A.2d at 564.
33. See generally JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW §
6.02 (1993); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
122 (5th ed. 1984).
34. See Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984)
(holding household exclusion clauses in auto policies invalid); Farmers Ins. Group v.
Reed, 712 P.2d 550 (Idaho 1985); Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 488 A.2d
166 (Md. 1985) (provision in area of mandatory liability insurance similar to
household exclusion clause held invalid); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820
(Mont. 1983) (abrogating immunity for auto negligence and holding household exclu-
sion clause invalid); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) (invalid for
mandatory coverage limits, and invalid above those limits unless the exclusion is
disclosed in writing).
35. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1979 & Cune. Supp. 1985)
(allowing household exclusion clauses in auto policies issued under uninsured motorist
statute); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boles, 481 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 1985); Walker v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1983); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
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2. Parental Negligence in the Business Context
A second common exception to parental immunity is when a
parent's negligence occurs in a business or employment con-
text.36 However, where a child is prohibited by immunity from
suing a parent directly for negligence occurring on the job,
some states do permit the child to sue the parent's employer
directly on the theory of respondeat superior. 7 Other states
bar the child's suit against the employer on the theory that
liability is derivative; if the parent is not liable, then the em-
ployer cannot be liable. 8
Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1983) (upholding validity of household exclusion clause).
36. See Trevarton v. Trevarton, 378 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1963); Dzenutis v. Dzenutis,
512 A.2d 130 (Conn. 1986) (such actions do not disrupt family harmony, and liability
insurance is prevalent); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905 (N.H. 1930); Signs v. Signs,
103 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1952); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975);
Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (no immunity for parental negli-
gence on the job when child is parent's employee, adopting rationale that such activi-
ties are not within parent's discretion or authority); Worrell v. Worrell, 4 S.E.2d 343
(Va. 1939) (parent/owner of common carrier is liable for negligence of servant causing
injury to child/passenger because of state's compulsory insurance requirement, and pa-
rental relationship is purely incidental to child's status as passenger); Borst v. Borst,
251 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 166 S.E. 538 (W. Va. 1932). Contra Shell
Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 403 A.2d 379 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (abrogating immunity
for suits by emancipated children and for suits involving cruel, inhuman or willful
misconduct, but preserving immunity for parental negligence in business context). See
generally, B.H. Glenn, Annotation, Liability of Employer for Injury to Wife or Child of
Employee Through Latter's Negligence, 1 A.L.R.3d 677, 699 (1965).
37. See Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 179 So. 908 (Ala. 1938); Begley v. Kohl &
Madden Printing Ink Co., 254 A-2d 907 (Conn. 1969); Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc.,
215 A.2d 427 (Del. 1965), on remand, 219 A-2d 374 (Del. Super. Ct. 1966); Stapleton
v. Stapleton, 70 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952); Hary v. Arney, 145 N.E.2d 575 (Ind.
App. 1957) (unincorporated association); Cody v. J. Dodd & Sons, 110 N.W.2d 255
(Iowa 1961) (partnership); O'Connor v. Benson Coal Co., 16 N.E.2d 636 (Mass. 1938);
Tobin v. Hoffman, 96 A.2d 597 (Md. 1953) partnership; Wright v. Wright, 50 S.E.2d
540 (N.C. 1948); Radelicki v. Travis, 120 A.2d 774 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956);
Damm v. Elyria Lodge No. 465, 107 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio 1952) (association); Hooper v.
Clements Food Co., 694 P.2d 943 (Okla. 1985) (permitting child's claim against
parent's employer for parental negligence on the job); Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 361
P.2d 64 (Or. 1961); Koontz v. Messer, 181 A. 792 (Pa. 1935); Trotti v. Piacente, 206
A.2d 462 (R.I. 1965); Littleton v. Jordan, 428 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
Freeland v. Freeland, 162 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1968).
38. See Sherby v. Weather Bros. Trans. Co., 421 F.2d 1243 (4th Cir. 1970)
(Maryland law); Stokes v. Association of Indep. Taxi Operators, Inc., 237 A.2d 762
(Md. 1968); Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16 (Neb. 1959).
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3. Nonphysical Injuries: Negligent Child Rearing and Parental
Abandonment
In Burnette v. Wahl, 9 the plaintiffs, several young children,
alleged that their mothers violated four Oregon statutes relat-
ing to parental duties,4" as well as intentional abandonment
and desertion.4 The children claimed emotional and psycholog-
ical injuries.
By declining to adopt a "parental desertion" tort cause of
action allowing recovery for breach of a statutory duty, the
court emphasized that neither the case law nor the legislature
allowed a cause of action for nonphysical injury resulting from
a parent's refusal to provide statutorily-required services.'
Since the legislature had enacted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme without creating such a right of action, the court felt it
was unwise to legislate from the bench, particularly in this
sensitive area of public policy."
Similarly, in Anderson v. Stream,' the Minnesota court
adopted a reasonably prudent parent standard for tort liability.
The court also stated that its total abolition of parental immu-
nity in favor of the new standard did not create a new right of
action for negligent child rearing as such actions violate public
policy.' Children have similarly been denied recovery for the
mental distress caused by divorce.47
39. 588 P.2d 1105 (Or. 1978).
40. The duty to support poor children, and three criminal statutes for neglect,
nonsupport and abandonment.
41. Burnette, 588 P.2d at 1105.
42. Id.
43. Id. See also Yost v. Yost, 190 A. 753 (Md. 1937) (barring child from suing
father for neglect and failure to support). See generally Reid H. Hamilton, Note, De-
fining the Parent's Duty After Rejection of Parent-Child Immunity: Parental Liability
for Emotional Injury to Abandoned Children, 33 VAND. L. REV. 775 (1980).
44. Burnette, 588 P.2d at 1105.
45. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
46. Id. at 601 n.9 (citing Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978)).
47. See Mroczynski v. McGrath, 216 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. 1966) (maintaining tradition-
al immunity).
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4. Reckless and Intentional Acts
Another area to which parental immunity does not generally
extend is reckless conduct, and many states have created this
exception.4" Such actions by a parent circumvent and step out-
side of the parent-child relationship.49 Similarly, a parent is
not immune from liability for his or her intentional acts.0
48. See Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1984) (stepfather's sexual as-
sault on child); Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982) (abolishing
immunity for willful and wanton actions such as drunk driving); Emery v. Emery,
289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955); Wright v. Wright, 70 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952) (reck-
less and drunk driving); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956) (finding no
immunity for willful and wanton conduct; and in this case, reckless driving); Larson
v. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. 1982) (listing exceptions to immunity- contri-
bution suits against parents are permissible, and no immunity for willful and wanton
acts; when death ends parent-child relationship; for parent's violation of a duty owed
to the public at large); Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 403 A.2d 379 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1979) (abrogating immunity for suits by emancipated children and for suits involving
cruel, inhuman or willful misconduct, but preserving immunity for parental negligence
in business context); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983) (finding that immu-
nity attaches for conduct within the parent's discretion or authority, so negligent
supervision claims are barred, but willful and wanton parental misconduct, such as
willful and wanton failure to watch a small child, is not protected); Small v. Rockfeld,
330 A.2d 335 (N.J. 1974) (negligent manslaughter); Leggett v. Leggett, 216 N.Y.S.2d
781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961); Meyer v. Ritterbush, 92 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949)
(barring deceased child's administrator from suing mother's estate when child died of
gas asphyxiation during mother's suicide; no cause of action absent allegation of
mother's willful misconduct); Tucker v. Tucker, 395 P.2d 67 (Okla. 1964); Cowgill v.
Boock, 218 P.2d 445 (Or. 1950) (drunk driving); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (willful and wanton misconduct); Jenkins v. Snohomish County
Pub. Util., 713 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1986); Hoffnan v. Tracy, 406 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1965);
Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971) (willful and wanton disregard by driving
while intoxicated). See generally Annotation, Liability of Parent or Person in Loco
Parentis for Personal Tort Against Minor Child, 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951) (collected cas-
es).
49. See Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1984); Attwood v. Estate of
Attwood, 633 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1982); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956);
Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951) (holding that a parent "forfeits his paren-
tal authority and privileges, including his immunity from suit" when committing out-
rageous acts. Here, the child's father killed the mother with shotgun in the child's
presence, kept the child with the mother's dead body for six days, and then commit-
ted suicide in front of the child); Jenkins v. Snohomish County Pub. Util., 713 P.2d
79 (Wash. 1986).
50. See Brown v. Cole, 129 S.W.2d 245 (Ark. 1939); Gillet v. Gillet, 335 P.2d 736
(Cal. App. 1959); Henderson v. Woolley, 644 A.2d 1303 (Conn. 1994) (child sexual
abuse); Edgington v. Edgington, 549 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 553
N.E.2d 395 (Ill. 1990); Treschman v. Treschman, 61 N.E. 961 (Ind. App. 1901);
Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951) (intentional infliction of emotional distress
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5. Wrongful Death
Another typical exception to parental immunity abrogates the
defense when either the parent or the child has died and a
wrongful death cause of action is instituted against the other.
The reason typically given is that the parent-child relationship
is terminated upon death."' Similarly, some states permit a
by father murdering mother and committing suicide, both in child's presence); Doe v.
Holt, 418 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. 1992) (father's malicious and willful rape and molestation
of daughters); Mancinelli v. Crosby, 589 A.2d 664 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991);
Cannon v. Cannon, 40 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1942); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Borchers, 445 N.E.2d 1160 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Brown v. Selby, 332 S.W.2d 166
(Tenn. 1960); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971); Talarico v.
Foremost Ins. Co., 712 P.2d 294 (Wash. 1986); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418
(W. Va. 1991) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress allowed, as are
other intentional tort claims, so long as the injury does not result from parent's rea-
sonable corporal punishment for disciplinary purposes); cf. Teramano v. Teramano,
216 N.E.2d 375 (Ohio 1966) (requiring actual intent).
51. See, e.g., Barnwell v. Cordle, 438 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971); Greene v. Basti,
391 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1968); Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1967) (Ala-
bama law); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 311
(5th Cir. 1966); Davis v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir. 1958) (Pennsylvania law);
Shaker v. Shaker, 29 A.2d 765 (Conn. 1942); Larson v. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (listing exceptions to immunity, including when death ends par-
ent-child relationship); Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (holding
that death ends need for immunity); Harlan Natl Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482
(Ky. 1961); Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954); Hale v. Hale, 230
S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1950) (finding no immunity when either parent or child dies); Ruiz
v. Clancy, 162 So. 734 (La. 1935); Oliveria v. Oliveria, 25 N.E.2d 766 (Mass. 1940);
Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Dean v. Smith, 211 KA2d 410
(N.H. 1965); Palcsey v. Tepper, 176 A-2d 818 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1962); Winn
v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984) (permitting mother who was separated from her
husband to sue him for wrongful death of the two children killed when the husband
drove drunk); Vidmar v. Sigmund, 162 A.2d 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960); Logan v.
Reaves, 354 S.W.2d 789 (Tenn. 1962); Lasecki v. Kabara, 294 N.W. 33 (Wis. 1940);
Morgan v. Leuck, 72 S.E.2d 825 (W. Va. 1952). Contra Lawber v. Doll, 547 N.E.2d
752 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that parent representative of deceased child cannot
sue other parent for wrongful death); Smith v. Gross, 571 A.2d 1219 (Md. 1990); Latz
v. Latz, 272 A.2d 435 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (finding that although mother was
killed as result of daughter's negligent driving, no cause of action exists); Damiano v.
Damiano, 143 A. 3 (N.J. 1928) (both parent and child dead, and since child had no
right of action at common law because of immunity, child has no right of action un-
der the Death Act for wrongful death); Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 432 S.W.2d 894
(Tenn. 1968); Hoffman v. Tracy, 406 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1965); Krause v. Home Mut.
Ins. Co., 112 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. 1961) (decided before Wisconsin abolished immunity
entirely in Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963)).
See generally Sallie M. Brinkley, Note, Parent-Child Tort Immunity Defense is
Applicable in Wrongful Death and Survival Actions Despite the Modern Trend Toward
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child to bring an action for wrongful death against a parent for
the death of the other parent.52 Furthermore, since wrongful
death actions are entirely statutory and the statutes do not
provide for the defense of immunity, it is not generally avail-
able.53
6. Prenatal Injuries, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Pregnancy
Traditionally, a child had no right of action against a parent
for prenatal injuries because a parent owed no duty to the
unborn.54 Today, however, children are almost universally per-
mitted to sue their parent for prenatal injuries.55 When a fetus
is harmed in utero due to the mother's wrongdoing, the born
child can sue the mother for those injuries.56 As to the stage of
Abrogation of the Doctrine, 20 U. BALT. L. REv. 277 (1990); Stacy L. Ross, Note, The
Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine Applied to Wrongful Death Actions: A Rule without
Reason, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175 (1988); Note, 16 U. ME. L. REV. 238 (1964).
52. See, e.g., Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Welch v. Davis, 101
N.E.2d 547 (Ill. 1951); Apitz v. Dames, 287 P.2d 585 (Or. 1955); Minikin v. Minikin,
7 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1939); Johnson v. Ottomeier, 275 P.2d 723 (Wash. 1954). Contra
Heyman v. Gordon, 190 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1963); Hance v. Haun, 391 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn.
1965). See generally Annotation, Action Against Parent by or on Behalf of Unemanci-
pated Minor Child for Wrongful Death of other Parent, 87 A.L.R.3d 849.
53. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. g (1977).
54. See Egbert v. Wenzl, 260 N.W.2d 480 (Neb. 1977).
55. See generally Ron Beal, Can I Sue Mommy? An Analysis of a Woman's Tort
Liability for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325
(1984); James Bopp, Jr. & Deborah H. Gardner, AIDS Babies, Crack Babies: Chal-
lenges to the Law, 7 ISsUES L. & MED. 3 (1991); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Preg-
nancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1992); Joseph S. Badger, Casenote, Staliman v. Youngquist "No,
You Can't Sue Mommy in Illinois: The Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Maternal Pre-
natal Civil Liability, 11 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 409 (1991); Gerard M. Bambrick, Note,
Developing Maternal Liability Standards for Prenatal Injury, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
592 (1987); Kathryn S. Banashek, Comment, Maternal Prenatal Negligence Does Not
Give Rise to a Cause of Action, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 189 (1990); Deborah Carroll, Note,
StalIman v. Youngquist The Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Maternal Civil Liability,
39 DEPAuL L. REv. 199 (1989); Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights:
Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection,
95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); David E. Koropp, Note, Setting the Standard: A Mother's
Duty During the Prenatal Period, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 493 (1989); Deborah M.
Santello, Note, Maternal Tort Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 22 SuFFOLK U. L. REV.
747 (1988); Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 47 (1978); Recent Case, 103 HARv. L. REV. 823 (1990); Roland F. Chase, An-
notation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971).
56. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900); Stallman v. Youngquist, 473 N.E.2d 400 (Ill.
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development of the fetus at the time of injury, some states say
the unborn must be "quick."57 Most states allow the cause of
action anyway, despite such fetal development tests." The
field of prenatal injury torts continues to evolve rapidly.59
A wrongful life cause of action is brought by a child who,
because of the parents' act or omission, is born deformed or
impaired. ° Of the states which have spoken to the issue, a
majority deny the child a wrongful life action for general dam-
ages for his or her deformities.6 Several states have statutes
addressing whether or not such an action will lie at all.62
A wrongful pregnancy tort results in the birth of a healthy
but unwanted child, and is typically brought against a physi-
App. Ct. 1984), appeal after remand, 504 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that
child hurt in utero in car accident caused by mother's negligence can sue mother,
despite parental immunity doctrine); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that prescription drug ingested during pregnancy caused child's
teeth to be brown and mother is liable if she acted unreasonably); Kalafut v. Gruver,
389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990) (allowing wrongful death action where child injured while
in utero, was born alive, then died later the same evening).
57. E.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951). A child is "quick"
when it has developed so that it moves within the mother's womb. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1247 (6th ed. 1990).
58. See, e.g., Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958); Smith v. Brennan,
157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960); Sylvia v.
Gobeille, 220 A-2d 222 (R.I. 1966).
59. See generally Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982) (court
split on many issues, with four of seven judges writing opinions).
60. See Michelle B. Laudor, In Defense of Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory
to the Defense of a Tort, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1675 (1994); Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Rethinking Wrongful Life: Bridging the Boundary Between Tort and Family Law, 67
TUL. L. REv. 397 (1992); Christine E. Dinsdale, Note, Child v. Parent: A Viable New
Tort of Wrongful Life?, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 391 (1982).
61. E.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315
(Idaho 1984); Goldberg v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406 (IM. 1986); Bruggeman v. Schiike,
718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986) ("life, even life with severe defects, cannot be an
injury in the legal sense"); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Procanik v.
Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), on remand, 502 A.2d 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1985); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985). Con-
tra Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 473 N.E.2d 244 (N.Y. 1984).
62. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982), construed in Turpin v. Sortini, 643
P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (wrongful life causes of action against parents prohibited); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 1989) (wrongful life and wrongful birth actions prohibit-
ed); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-55 (1981) (wrongful life and wrongful birth ac-
tions prohibited).
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cian or contraceptive manufacturer for failing to prevent a preg-
nancy." The majority of jurisdictions recognizing this action
allow the parents to sue,' but not the child," even if the
child is illegitimate."
7. Negligent Supervision
Suits alleging negligent supervision of a child are typically
prohibited since the essence of such an action is so closely in-
tertwined with a parent's discretion and authority. However,
some courts have permitted actions for negligent supervision."
63. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55
(5th ed. 1984).
64. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 1967) (Called into
doubt by Cal. App. Ct. but not yet overruled); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn.
1982); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (superseded by
statute).
65. See, e.g., White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981) (denying
action by siblings as well); Stribling v. de Quevedo, 432 A.2d 239 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980).
66. See, e.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. 76Ct. App. 1981), over-
ruled by Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (1992)). Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849
(ill. App. 1963) (barring child's suit for illegitimate birth).
67. See Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979) (abrogating immunity for auto
negligence but refusing to allow claims of negligent supervision); Pedigo v. Rowley,
610 P.2d 560 (Idaho 1980) (finding no cause of action exists for contribution by third
party against father for negligent supervision because father's liability is barred by
immunity, and parental immunity also bars third party contribution action); Wagner
v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983) (adopting parental authority and discretion
area of immunity and barring suit for negligent supervision); Haddrill v. Damon, 386
N.W.2d 643 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Wright v. Wright, 351 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984) (adopting zone of immunity extending to acts within parent's authority and dis-
cretion and barring negligent supervision cause of action); Holodook v. Spencer, 324
N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974); Sixkller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1984) (barring
cause of action for negligent supervision); Bell v. Hudgins, 352 S.E.2d 332 (Va. 1987)
(holding that without principal-agent relationship, parent is not liable for minor
child's intentional acts based on claim of parental negligence in failing to control
child); Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E.2d 223, 225 (Va. 1972) (finding that father's negli-
gence, if any, "bespeaks only his failure to discharge the normal parental duty of
supervising and providing a safe place for the child to play").
68. See, e.g., Hartigan v. Beery, 470 N.E.2d 571 (IM. App. Ct. 1984) (allowing
third party contribution action against parent for negligent supervision because right
of contribution prevails over immunity); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn.
1980) (child wandered into driveway and was hit); Convery v. Maczka, 394 A.2d 1250
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Andrews v. County of Otsego, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (allowing child's cause of action for negligent supervision
against foster parent); Miller v. Leljedal, 455 A.2d 256 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983);
Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 201 N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1972) (child,
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Parents have been found not liable for failing to teach a child
how to cross the street safely69 and how to use automobile
seat belts.7" Similarly, no liability was found when a child
wandered off and was bitten by a dog,7 and where a child
was struck when he rode his tricycle through a gate left open
by the parent.72 Finally, several courts have held that some
household risks are so common that there is no liability for
injuries resulting from them.73
However, if the parent acts affirmatively74 or notices a dan-
ger and takes measures to protect against it but does so negli-
gently,7" the scope of the parent's discretion narrows. Similar-
ly, allowing a child near a dangerous instrumentality may ex-
pose a parent to liability,76 particularly when the parent keeps
dangerous instrumentalities at home.77
Two Iowa cases with similar facts yielded different results. In
Wagner v. Smith," a four year old was barred by parental im-
munity from recovering for serious injuries incurred when the
child's father allowed the child near a grain auger.79 Two
years later, the same court held that immunity was not neces-
sarily a bar when a four year old suffocated in his father's
grain loading operation because, in that case, the plaintiff fo-
who was left alone in the house, wandered off and was hit); Thomas v. Kells, 191
N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1971).
69. See Lemmen v. Servais, 158 N.W.2d 341 (Wis. 1968).
70. See Latta v. Siefke, 401 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
71. See Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983) (holding that immunity atta-
ches for conduct within the parent's discretion or authority, so negligent supervision
claims are barred).
72. See Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800 (Ariz. 1981).
73. See, e.g., Cosmopolitan Natl Bank v. Heap, 262 N.E.2d 826 (Ill. App. Ct.
1970) (barring cause of action when father left stairway carpet loose); Hush v.
Devilbliss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (vaporizer); Cherry v. Cherry,
203 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. 1972) (electrical extension cord).
74. Romanik v. Toro Co., 277 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. 1979).
75. Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 201 N.W.2d 745 (Wis.
1972) (finding liability when child was known to run into the street).
76. Howes v. Hansen, 201 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. 1972); Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
177 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. 1970) (small child fell from swing).
77. Dower v. Goldstein, 363 A.2d 373 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (vicious
dog); Goedkoop v. Ward Pavement, 378 N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (blasting
caps).
78. 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983) (adopting parental authority and discretion area
of immunity and barring suit for negligent supervision).
79. Id. at 255-56.
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cused on negligence occurring outside of the parental relation-
ship rather than on any breached duty of supervision."
8. Parent's Violation of Duty Owed to the Public and Third
Party Actions
Liability is sometimes found when a parent violates a duty
owed to the public at large and where the family relationship is
only incidental to the wrongful act or omission.8 '
The most typical situation with third party actions arises
when a child sues a third party and that third party then sues
the child's parent seeking contribution or indemnity.82 In
Holodook v. Spencer,3 the court did not permit contribution
from parents when the claim against them in the action was
80. Caniglia v. Lary, 366 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1985).
81. See, e.g., Larson v. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221, 224-225 (Il. App. Ct. 1982)
(listing exceptions to immunity, including allowing contribution suits against parents
and actions against a parent for violation of a duty owed to the public at large);
Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (IMI. App. Ct. 1978) (parent's violation of
ordinance by not trimming trees obstructed view and driver hit child on bicycle; child
was allowed to sue parent); Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)
(daughter ran into pedestrian who happened to be her father); Caniglia, 366 N.W.2d
at 548 (distinguishing between negligent supervision, where immunity attaches, and
negligence outside of the parental role, where immunity may not attach); Carey v.
Meijer, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 478 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (permitting contribution against
mother despite immunity because she was not exercising reasonable parental discre-
tion); Grivas v. Grivas, 496 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that mother
was not liable for not teaching child lawnmower dangers, but could be liable for leav-
ing it running and unattended since reasonable care is owed to everyone).
82. See, e.g., Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560 (Idaho 1980) (child struck by a
speedboat in a lake sued the boat owners, and the boat owners sought contribution
from the father based on a claim of negligent supervision. The court held that no
cause of action existed for contribution by the third party against the father for negli-
gent supervision because the father's liability is barred by immunity, and parental
immunity also bars third party contribution action); Hartigan v. Beery, 470 N.E.2d
571 (1i. App. Ct. 1984) (allowing third party contribution action against a parent for
negligent supervision); Larson, 435 N.E.2d at 221 (despite parental immunity, con-
tribution actions against a parent are permissible); Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 342
S.E.2d 882 (N.C. 1986) (prohibiting manufacturer from seeking contribution from par-
ent because parent could not be held liable in a direct action by the injured child);
Nolechek v. Gesuale, 385 N.E.2d 1268 (N.Y. 1978) (allowing contribution based on
claim of negligent entrustment of dangerous instrumentality); Holodook v. Spencer,
324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974) (barring third party contribution action based on negli-
gent supervision).
83. 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974).
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for negligent supervision because such claims were barred as
being within the parent's discretion and authority.'
In Nolechek v. Gesuale,"5 however, a contribution action was
permitted when the claim against the parents was for negligent
entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality, as opposed to a
claim of negligent supervision, which the court distinguished. In
Nolechek, an unlicensed teenage boy who was blind in one eye
died after riding his motorcycle into a steel cable that defen-
dants had strung near a roadway.86 The defendants were al-
lowed to bring their contribution action against the boy's par-
ents for negligently entrusting a dangerous instrumentality (the
motorcycle) to their son."
Other examples where a parent may be liable on the same
theory include negligently entrusting a dangerous instrumental-
ity such as a gun," or an instrument which can be particu-
larly dangerous to a specific child because of his or her suscep-
tibility to use it improperly.89 The parent's knowledge of the
child's propensity to misuse the item may be important in de-
termining the parent's liability. °
84. Id. at 346.
85. 385 N.E.2d 1268 (N.Y. 1978); cf Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981)
(refusing to address immunity in a contribution context).
86. 385 N.E.2d at 1274.
87. Id. The court reiterated that a child still cannot sue a parent for negligent
entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality. Such a suit is permissible only when
brought by a third party because of the parent's duty to third parties. Id. at 1270-71.
88. See, e.g., Lichtenthal v. Gawoski, 354 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)
(stating that a parent has duty to third parties, and a cause of action exists against
parents for negligently entrusting a dangerous b-b gun to a child); Howell v.
Hairston, 199 S.E.2d 766 (S.C. 1973); Prater v. Burns, 525 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1975).
89. See, e.g., Thompson v. Havard, 235 So. 2d 853 (Ala. 1970) (car); Jarboe v.
Edwards, 223 A.2d 402 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1966); Davis v. Gavalas, 139 S.E. 577 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1927) (velocipede); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 160 N.E. 334 (Mass. 1928);
May v. Goulding, 111 N.W.2d 862 (Mich. 1961) (mentally ill child with semi-automat-
ic rifle); Nolechek, 385 N.E.2d at 1268 (providing unlicensed minor who was blind in
one eye with a motorcycle); Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div.
1950) (baseball bat); Johnson v. Glidden, 76 N.W. 933 (S.D. 1898).
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IV. ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY AND CURRENT
STATUS OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY
A. Alternative Standards
Of the states which adopted parental immunity, the majority
initially modeled their rule after Hewlette, holding that an un-
emancipated child could not sue a parent for personal torts."
Those states then began creating exceptions to the rule, abro-
gating it in a piecemeal fashion and narrowing its applicability
such that some jurisdictions retain the doctrine today in narrow
circumstances.2
However, some states which had initially adopted traditional
parental immunity have since abolished it in its entirety,"
substituting an alternative standard for parental liability; eight
states have declined adoption of any parental immunity
91. See supra notes 4-16 and accompanying text.
92. See supra part III; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1965) (statuto-
ry immunity for custodial parents but direct action against insurer permitted);
Veselits v. Veselits, 653 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Miss. 1987); Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d
801 (Ala. 1992); Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1984) (per curiam) (abrogation
of immunity is an exclusively legislative decision); Thomas v. Inmon, 594 S.W.2d 853
(Ark. 1980); Dubay v. Irish, 542 A2d 711 (Conn. 1988) (barring child rendered in-
competent after ingesting mother's prescription drugs from suing mother for negli-
gence where child did not allege mother's willful and wanton misconduct); Frye v.
Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986) (finding that traditional basis for immunity, i.e. pre-
serving family tranquility, is still valid today, and refusing to abrogate it even for
auto negligence claims because that is within the purview of the legislature, which
had created mandatory auto liability insurance scheme); Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 342
S.E.2d 882 (N.C. 1986); Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E.2d 223 (Va. 1972); Courtney v.
Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that despite abrogation for intention-
al torts, general parental immunity for negligence is retained).
93. E.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981); Kirchner
v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275 (Ohio 1984); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971);
Elam v. Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980) (abolishing parental immunity and holding
unconstitutional a statute abrogating parental immunity for auto negligence claims
only).
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rules.94 New York's standard for parental liability is somewhat
uncertain.95
1. Exercise of Parental Discretion or Authority
Wisconsin abrogated parental immunity, except when the
allegedly negligent act occurs in the realm of parental discre-
tion or authority." As to what constitutes parental discretion,
the court indicated it includes matters such as providing the
child with food, clothing, shelter, and medical and dental
care.97 A significant number of states have also chosen this
approach."
94. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967) (refusing to adopt a specific
scope of liability and allowing claim for parental auto negligence); Peterson v. City
and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969); Nocktonick v. Nolcktonick, 611
P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980) (in question of first impression, court refuses to adopt parental
immunity, and limits its holding to allow parental auto negligence claim); Nuelle v.
Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967) (declining adoption of any specific form of paren-
tal immunity, relying on statutory requirement that everyone is responsible for inju-
ries they cause); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974) (abrogating
interspousal immunity, but since Nevada had never adopted parental immunity, a
child was free to sue a parent in tort without limitation); Kloppenburg v.
Kloppenburg, 280 N.W. 206 (S.D. 1938) (addressing parental immunity but applying
Minnesota law); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980) (parental immunity has
never been adopted, either by case law or statute); Wood v. Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt.
1977) (refusing to adopt parental immunity).
95. See Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974) (barring negligent super-
vision claims against parents); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969)
(abrogating immunity for nonwillful torts); Hairston v. Broadwater, 342 N.Y.S.2d 787
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
96. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
97. Id. at 198.
98. See Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (Ariz. 1970); Schneider v. Coe, 405
A-2d 682 (Del. 1979); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Cates v. Cates, 619
N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1993); Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1983) (adopting pa-
rental authority and discretion area of immunity); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786
(Iowa 1981); Horn v. Horn, 630 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1982) (defining parental authority as
discipline and parental discretion as those matters which parents are legally obligated
to provide their children); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970) (adopting
zone of immunity as conduct within parental authority and discretion); Black v.
Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979); Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972);
Haddrill v. Damon, 386 N.W.2d 643 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Wright v. Wright, 351
N.W.2d 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (adopting zone of immunity extending to acts with-
in parent's authority and discretion); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J. 1983)
(immunity attaches for conduct within the parent's discretion or authority); Fritz v.
Anderson, 371 A.2d 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); Holodook v. Spencer, 324
N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984); Silva v. Silva,
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2. Reasonably Prudent Parent Standard
Rather than applying a per se rule immunizing parents from
liability for their negligent acts, some states have adopted a
reasonably prudent parent standard for determining liability.99
In Gibson v. Gibson,00 the California court felt it "intolerable"
that parents could "act negligently with impunity" if they were
smart enough to pigeonhole their behavior into either the pa-
rental discretion or parental authority category.'
The majority in Anderson v. Stream °2 felt that a reasonably
prudent parent standard adequately protected a parent's zone of
discretion and authority.03 It provides sufficient flexibility for
parents and allows juries to perform their function.'" Further-
more, the court said that a child should not be denied a right
of action in light of the prevalence of liability insurance and the
state's constitutional right to compensation for injuries incurred
by the wrongdoing of another.' 5
The dissent in Anderson harshly criticized the majority's
adoption of a reasonableness standard, arguing that there really
is no objective standard for raising children, that each juror's
446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982) (utilizing parental authority and discretion standard for
protected conduct); Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988) (protecting only those
activities within parent's discretion and authority); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473
S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (adopting rationale that activities within parent's discretion or
authority are protected); Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 177 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. 1970).
99. See Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (adopting reasonably prudent parent standard and overrul-
ing earlier case which had abrogated general immunity except where the parental act
involved reasonable authority or ordinary discretion); Hartman v. Hartman, 821
S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991) (abrogating parental immunity and adopting reasonably pru-
dent parent standard); Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176 (Mo. 1982)
(whether immunity attaches is determined on case-by-case basis). See generally Luke
K Cooperrider, Child v. Parent in Tort: A Case for the Jury, 43 MINN. L. REV. 73
(1958); Note, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort
Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795 (1976).
100. 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (expressly rejecting adoption of the two areas of
immunity enunciated in Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963)).
101. Id. at 653.
102. 295 N.W.2d 595, 599-600 (Minn. 1980); see also ME. CONST. art. I, § 19; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 16 (constitutional rights for redress of injuries).
103. Anderson, 295 N.W.2d at 599.
104. Id. at 600.
105. Id. at 600-01.
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notions of parenting will differ, that it will be problematic to
craft a jury instruction for the standard, and that the standard
will unfairly punish parents whose child rearing practices do
not conform to community expectations.0 5
3. Restatement Section 895G Standard
The Restatement rejects parental immunity but does provide
that "Ir]epudiation of general tort immunity does not establish
liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child
relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious."1 °7 This
section recognizes that certain parental functions such as au-
thority and supervision are discretionary, and it takes into
account those behaviors which may be so closely related to
parental discretion that liability should not be imposed for
them.' 8 Accordingly, the Restatement approach parallels both
Goller and Gibson. °9  Although this standard appears
somewhat indeterminate, its purpose was not to define any
particular scope of parental liability or to create categories as a
matter of law. Rather, it attempts to offer parents flexibility
and children a remedy for personal injuries, regardless of the
tortfeasor's familial relationship to the child-plaintiff.
Several jurisdictions have either expressly adopted this stan-
dard or supported its rationale."' For example, Oregon opted
106. Id. at 602-604 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(2) (1977).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. k (1977) ("[To say that the
standard of a reasonable prudent parent is applied should be . .. to require that the
conduct be palpably unreasonable in order to impose liability"); see also Cates v.
Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 729 (Ill. 1993) (limiting immunity to "conduct inherent to the
parent-child relationship").
109. The Restatement further provides, "[i]f the conduct giving rise to an injury
does not grow directly out of the family relationship, the existence of negligence may
be determined as if the parties were not related." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
895 G Cmt. k (1977).
110. See Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987) (expressly rejecting adoption
of any form of parental immunity in spite of Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413,
417 (D.D.C. 1968) and approving of Restatement standard); Tamashiro v. De Gama,
450 P.2d 998 (Haw. 1969); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 262 N.W.2d 625 (Mich. 1978); Balts
v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966) (decided before Minnesota adopted reasonably
prudent parent standard in 1980); Vickers v. Vickers, 242 A.2d 57 (N.H. 1968); Winn
v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984).
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for the Restatement approach in Winn v. Gilroy.. because it
did not care for either the Wisconsin or California standards.
The Winn court had interpretive problems with the Wisconsin
rule" that immunity attaches when the activity involves ei-
ther parental authority or parental discretion,"' and felt that
California's reasonably prudent parent standard"4 would send
every case to the jury, with little chance of establishing bound-
aries within which parents could feel comfortable in performing
their parental functions.'15
B. To Whom and When Might Immunity Attach?
Immunity may attach to those who stand in loco parentis."'
However, where someone is merely a custodian and does not
stand in loco parentis, a child's suit may proceed because im-
munity will not attach."7 Several courts have permitted suits
by a child against his or her noncustodial parent."'
111. 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984).
112. Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
113. Winn, 681 P.2d at 780-783.
114. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
115. Winn, 681 P.2d at 783-786.
116. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992) (providing immunity to
foster parent from negligence claims); Clabough v. Rachwal, 335 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that a grandchild cannot sue grandmother for wrongful death of
child's mother since, after mother's death, child was in grandmother's custody);
Coleman v. Coleman, 278 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (barring child from suing
noncustodial parent for auto negligence because he is still a parent and entitled to
protection); Maddox v. Queen, 257 S.E.2d 919 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (grandfather stood
in loco parentis); Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (Ill. 1978) (extending immunity
to teacher's discipline and authority because teachers stand in loco parentis by stat-
ute); Lawber v. Doll, 547 N.E.2d 752 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (stepfather stood in loco pa-
rentis); Wooden v. Hale, 426 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1967). For commentary on immunity for
foster parents, see E. Russell March Ill, Note, Doctrine of Parental Immunity Extend-
ed to Foster Parents Standing In Loco Parentis for Claims of Simple Negligence, 23
CUmB. L. REv. 483 (1992-1993).
117. See Brown v. Cole, 129 S.W.2d 245 (Ark. 1939) (adoptive parents); Gulledge v.
Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429 (l. App. Ct. 1977) (grandparents); Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441
N.E.2d 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (noncustodial parent); Treschman v. Treschman, 61
N.E. 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 1901); Mayberry v. Prior, 374 N.W.2d 683 (Mich. 1985) (foster
parent); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (noncustodial parent); Clasen v.
Pruhs, 95 N.W. 640 (Neb. 1903); Wilkins v. Kane, 181 A.2d 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1962) (grandparent); Cwik v. Zylstra, 155 A.2d 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959) (grandparent); Andrews v. County of Otsego, 446 N.Y.S.2d 169 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982) (allowing child's cause of action for negligent supervision against foster parent).
118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:571 (West 1965) (statutory immunity for custodial
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The states have taken one of two paths regarding parental
immunity: either they have adopted the traditional rule and
carved out exceptions,' or they have abrogated it entirely or
refused to adopt it at all.120 Among the states which have ei-
ther abolished or never adopted traditional parental immunity,
there are in general three alternative standards: the reasonably
prudent parent standard, the Restatement standard, and the
standard protecting parents from liability for only those actions
arising from their parental authority or discretion.'
It is important to consider the various factors which can be
determinative of parental liability to a child in tort: whether
the tortious act was reckless or intentional, whether the defen-
dant stood in loco parentis, whether the negligence occurred in
a business context or other recognized exception, and whether
the child is legally emancipated. 2
V. ANALOGIZING TO INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
Many of the arguments advanced for maintaining parental
immunity were also once used in support of interspousal tort
immunity. Interspousal immunity, however, has been largely
abolished' because the rule no longer advanced its own un-
parents but direct action against insurer allowed); see, e.g., Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441
N.E.2d 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (allow-
ing child to sue noncustodial parent only after an evidentiary hearing shows that suit
would not disrupt family harmony).
119. See supra parts II & III.
120. See supra part IV.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (1981); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-313
(McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1 (Michie
1981); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-19 (1969), construed in Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244
S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
statutory interspousal immunity unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Beattie
v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (abolishing immunity for negligence
claims); Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506
(Md. 1983) (explaining how all states have dealt with interspousal immunity);
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205
(Miss. 1988); Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1986); Fitzmaurice v.
Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932); Maestas v. Overton, 531 P.2d 947 (N.M.
1975) (abolishing interspousal immunity for unintentional torts); Shearer v. Shearer,
480 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1985); Heino v. Harper, 759 P.2d 253 (Or. 1988); Davis v. Da-
vis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983); Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987). But see
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derlying rationales.' 4 The early common law idea of "unity of
person7 upon marriage was the major reason for barring a
wife's tort claim against her husband. But with adoption by all
states of Married Women's Property Acts, the "unity of person"
concept became irrelevant, and wives were permitted to sue
husbands for property-related torts.'
Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 282 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 1981) (interspousal immuni-
ty withstands equal protection and due process scrutiny, and legislature, not court,
must abrogate). As of 1989, 40 states had abolished interspousal immunity in its
entirety. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 848-49 (5th ed.
1990).
For cases abolishing interspousal immunity as to auto negligence claims, see
Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878 (Ariz. 1982); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 539
P.2d 566 (Idaho 1974); Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); Immer v. Risko,
267 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1970); Asplin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 394 A.2d 1353 (R.I. 1978)
(abolishing immunity as to auto negligence when either spouse dies); Digby v. Digby,
388 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1978); Richard v. Richard, 300 A.2d 637 (Vt. 1973); Surrat v.
Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971).
For cases abolishing interspousal immunity as to intentional tort actions, see
Windauer v. O'Conner, 485 P.2d 1157 (Ariz. 1971); Ebert v. Ebert, 656 P.2d 766
(Kan. 1983); Flores v. Flores, 506 P.2d 345 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 506 P.2d
336 (N.M. 1973); Apitz v. Dames, 287 P.2d 585 (Or. 1955); Bounds v. Caudle, 560
S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), appeal after new trial, 611 S.W.2d 685.
For cases permitting various causes of action between spouses, see Klein v.
Klein, 376 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1962) (slip and fall); Garrity v. Garrity, 504 N.E.2d 617
(Mass. 1987) (breach of fiduciary duty); Nogueira v. Nogueira, 444 N.E.2d 940 (Mass.
1983) (libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Brown v. Brown, 409
N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1980) (slip and fall); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951 (N.J.
1978) (negligence); Slansky v. Slansky, 553 A.2d 152 (Vt. 1988) (conversion); Young v.
Young, 709 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1985) (conversion).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F (1977); Marvin M.
Moore, The Case for Retention of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 7 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
943 (1980); Robert G. Spector, All in the Family-Tort Litigation Comes of Age, 28
FAM. L. Q. 363 (1994); Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L.
REV. 359 (1989); Patricia K. Fenske, Note, Oregon's Hostility to Policy Arguments:
Heino v. Harper and the Abolition of Interspousal Immunity, 68 OR. L. REV. 197
(1989); Rhonda L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New
Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LOY. LA_ L. REV. 1025 (1992); Lansing C.
Scriven, Comment, The Florida Legislature Tolls the Death Knell for Interspousal
Immunity in Tort, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725 (1985).
124. See, e.g., Counts v. Counts, 266 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1980), abrogated by VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-220.1 (Michie 1981) (husband's suit for injuries sustained in his wife's
failed murder-for-hire scheme barred because it would disrupt marital harmony).
125. See, e.g., Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Brooks v. Robinson,
284 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 1972). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 848-49 (5th ed. 1990); JOHN DE WrIT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
FA ILY LAW § 6.02[A] (1993); PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW §§ 5.02, 8.01[A]
(1990).
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In Thompson v. Thompson, 6 however, the United States
Supreme Court held that adoption of Married Women's Property
Acts did not create a right of action for a wife to sue her hus-
band for personal injury torts.'27 Such actions were barred be-
cause they disrupt family peace and harmony and create fraud-
ulent and collusive claims. 2' The same argument is used for
parental immunity as well, but it suffers from the same weak-
nesses in the parent-child context as it did in the spousal con-
text.
Some courts based their retention of parental immunity on
an analogy to interspousal immunity,'29 but Virginia has held
that any analogy to interspousal immunity is "fallacious" be-
cause the public policy concerns for maintaining parental immu-
nity are so different from those which at one time were urged
in support of interspousal immunity.3 ° Further, there never
existed any common law "unity of person" between children and
their parents.''
Another argument typically advanced as justification for pa-
rental immunity is the danger of fraud and collusion between
parent and child.' 2 This reasoning, too, has been largely dis-
credited as a justification for immunity. 3' Virginia has ex-
pressly rejected this rationale, holding that courts should not
126. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 637 (Me. 1979) (analogy of parental im-
munity to interspousal immunity is "misplaced").
130. See Midkiff v. Midkiff, 113 S.E.2d 875 (Va. 1960); See also Worrell v. Worrell,
4 S.E.2d 343 (Va. 1939).
131. See Black, 409 A.2d at 637; Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12, 24 (N.C. 1923)
(Clark, C.J., dissenting) ("There were . . .radical distinctions at common law between
the status of wife and child.").
132. For courts utilizing this rationale for interspousal immunity and barring the
claim, see Newton v. Weber, 196 N.Y.S. 113 (1922); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304
(1877).
133. Some courts use a "baby with the bath water" argument, stating that the
remedy for fraudulent and collusive claims is to ferret them out by means that al-
ready exist rather than barring all meritorious claims. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 376
P.2d 70 (Cal. 1962); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975); Beaudette v.
Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y.
1969); Ramey v. Ramey, 258 S.E.2d 883 (S.C. 1979) (rejecting the fraud and collusion
arguments in striking down a guest-passenger statute).
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immunize a tortfeasor merely because the possibility of fraud
and collusion exists."M
The most common reason relied upon for maintaining paren-
tal immunity today is that it protects and preserves family
tranquility and harmony.' In fact, Virginia bases its reten-
tion of the doctrine solely on the rationale that a child's suit in
negligence (outside the automobile context) against a parent
would disturb family harmony."6 Interestingly, though, the
Virginia Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea that suits
between siblings disrupt family tranquility.3
7
Some courts have challenged the rationale underlying the
family harmony argument, in that prohibiting a child's personal
injury claim against a parent while permitting other causes of
action "is indeed not only to perpetuate confusion and irrecon-
cilable decisions, but to entrench a policy from which changing
times have drained most of such vitality as it may have once
possessed."3 '
134. See Midkiff v. Midkiff, 113 S.E.2d 875 (Va. 1960) (suit between siblings); see
also Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987) (possibility of fraud exists in suits
between husband and wife but that did not stop the legislature from abolishing
interspousal immunity); Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966) (fraud is also a
possibility where a suit is permitted, such as in actions between spouses, host and
guest, and close relatives; court will not deny a child's claim because of a mere possi-
bility).
135. In the arena of interspousal immunity, one court said that suits between
spouses create "an era of ... unchastity, of bastardy, of dissoluteness, of violence,
cruelty, and murders." Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858).
136. Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); see also Wright v. Wright, 191
S.E.2d 223, 224 (Va. 1972) (quoting Norfolk Southern R.R. v. Gretakis, 174 S.E. 841
(Va. 1934)) (the purpose of the doctrine is "to protect parental discipline, domestic
felicity, and family tranquility").
137. Midkiff v. Midkiff, 113 S.E.2d 875, 878 (Va. 1960).
138. Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (N.H. 1966); see also Hebel v. Hebel, 435
P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970); Gibson v. Gibson,
479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Peterson v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007
(Haw. 1969); Rigdon v. Ridgon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Black v. Solmitz, 409
A.2d 634, 636 (Me. 1979) (justification for immunity based upon preserving family
harmony "cannot withstand close scrutiny. So many exceptions and qualifications have
evolved in application of the rule . . . that the asserted rationale can no longer serve
as a valid basis for a sweeping denial of liability."); Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d
169 (Mich. 1972); Balts v. Bats, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966); Rupert v. Stienne, 528
P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974); France v. A.P.A. Transport, 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969); Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364
(N.D. 1967); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473
S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971); Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Goller v.
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In Rousey v. Rousey,"9 the court found it anomalous that
children were permitted to sue parents for property and con-
tract claims but not for personal tort claims, and particularly
inconsistent that the District of Columbia legislature had al-
ready abolished interspousal immunity, since both parental and
interspousal immunity were based on preserving family har-
mony."4 It is the "height of inconsistency" to deny a child a
claim which is permitted if brought by a wife." Furthermore,
precisely how a child's uncompensated injury preserves peace in
a family has not been convincingly described."
VI. CONCLUSION
A child injured as the result of another's negligence should
not be denied a remedy for the sole reason that the tortfeasor
is the child's parent.' The prevalence of both homeowner's
and auto liability insurance cannot be ignored as a source of
funds for personal injuries, regardless of the plaintiffs relation
to the insured. Furthermore, one might argue that denying a
child's claim against a parent would cause just as much dis-
ruption to the family as permitting the action. For instance,
how would the family pay for the child's medical expenses or
attend to the child's needs?' T
By the same token, however, parents should be given some
discretion in their relationships with their children. The ap-
proach which best accommodates these competing interests is
White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
139. 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987).
140. Id. at 417 n.1, 418.
141. KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 122, at 905 n.45; Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d
481, 488 (N.J. 1970) (abrogating interspousal immunity for auto negligence, and not-
ing that a system is "wanting" which allows the claim when brought by strangers or
more distant relatives while prohibiting it when brought by a spouse).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. c (1977); W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., supra note 141, at § 122.
143. See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12, 18 (N.C. 1923) (Clark, C.J., dissent-
ing) (stating that an injured person's relationship to the tortfeasor is "entirely irrele-
vant").
144. See, e.g., Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869, 871 (N.M. 1981) ("The argu-
ments that family relationships will be weakened and destroyed by bringing a lawsuit
is not persuasive. The relationships will be affected to a much greater extent by the
conduct between the parties that causes the lawsuit to be filed.").
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the Restatement view, which rejects parental immunity based
solely on the family relationship, but accommodates a parent's
need for leeway.'
The Restatement recognizes that some everyday intentional
contacts between family members would be actionable if they
occurred between strangers,' such that the notion of consent
arises in those family contacts.'47 Similarly, for negligence oc-
curring in the intimacies of family life, the Restatement
analogizes to assumption of the risk in general tort law.'
The reality is that there are some incidents of family life for
which there is no blameworthiness.
The inconsistencies resulting from application of parental
immunity defy logic. Why, for instance, can a child sue a non-
custodial parent, but not a custodial parent? Why may a child
sue a parent for breach of contract or for a property-related tort
but not for a personal injury tort? How can it be asserted that
family disruption results from suits for personal torts but not
from these other, permissible suits?'
There is no logical answer to these questions. Perhaps at one
time the doctrine had value enough to justify its own existence,
but, today, parental immunity is an anachronism. 'When... a
rule is the product of a conceptualism long ago discarded, is
universally criticized by scholars, and has been qualified or
abandoned in many jurisdictions, it should receive the most
careful scrutiny."5 ' The doctrine of parental tort immunity
was created by 1891 case law and has been substantially abro-
gated in most of the states which had adopted it. This doctrine
and its rationale deserve to be revisited by the courts which
created it when the opportunity to do so presents itself. The
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1977).
146. See also Midkiff v. Midkiff, 113 S.E.2d 875, 878 (Va. 1960) (quoting William
E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persosn in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030,
1077 (1929-30)) ("[The relationship of brothers living in the same house may 'render
innocuous many acts and omissions that would usually be tortious'").
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. k (1977).
148. Id.
149. See Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ohio 1952) ("It is difficult to under-
stand by what legerdemain of reason, logic or law" a child's property rights are pro-
tected but their redress for personal injury is not, "or how it can be said that do-
mestic harmony would be undisturbed in one case and be upset in the other.").
150. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81-82 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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efficacy of the doctrine in serving its intended purpose should
be subjected to careful review.
When there is no longer a reason for a common law rule, the
rule can be dispensed with by the courts that created
it' 5 -- witness the downfall of interspousal immunity. For that
reason, judicial pronouncements that such decisions are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature ring hollow.'' 'To
reject a precedent is not merely to reach a different result, but
to find that the reasoning and principles advanced in favor of
that precedent are no longer persuasive." 5'
Sandra L. Haley
151. See, e.g., Black v. Sohnitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639 (Me. 1979) ("Since the rule of
parental immunity was a rule originally fashioned by the courts, the courts have the
primary responsibility to limit its application when they perceive that it operates er-
ratically with respect to fulfillment of its underlying purpose and produces undesir-
able results in frequently recurring kinds of situation.").
152. See, e.g., Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164, 164 (Ala. 1984) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that abrogation of immunity is an exclusively legislative decision); Frye v. Frye,
505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986) (refusing to abrogate immunity even for auto negligence
claims because that is within the purview of the legislature, which had created man-
datory auto liability insurance scheme).
153. Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ohio 1985).
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